We elicit the risk preferences of a sample of French farmers in a field-experiment setting, considering both expected utility and cumulative prospect theory. Under the EU framework, our results show that farmers are characterised by a concave utility function for gain outcomes implying risk aversion. The CPT framework confirms this result, but also suggests that farmers are twice as sensitive to losses as to gains and tend to pay undue attention to unlikely extreme outcomes. Accounting for loss aversion and probability weighting can make a difference in the design of effective and efficient policies, contracts or insurance schemes.
Introduction
For decades, risk has been a central feature of studies in the field of agricultural economics because it is intrinsic to agricultural production, and it plays a key role in the decisions farmers make every day. For instance, risk has been shown to be a crucial element in understanding crop diversification (Serra et al., 2009) , contract choice (Zheng, Vukina and Shin, 2008; Dubois and Vukina, 2009) , insurance take-up (Mahul, 2003; Coble, 2004) or innovation adoption (Abadi Ghadim, Pannell and Burton, 2005; Kallas, Serra and Gil, 2010) . Behaviour under risk typically results from the interplay of the risk level faced by decision-makers and their own sensitivity to risk, i.e. their risk preferences. The latter being key factors in explaining variability in behaviour between decision-makers, a lot of effort has been devoted to measure farmers' risk preferences with reliable direct methods. In experimental methods, they are elicited from real choices between lotteries (see the seminal papers by Binswanger (1980) or Binswanger (1981) ). In revealed preference methods, they are imputed from the divergence between observed farmers' decisions (input use, output choice) and expected decisions in the absence of risk (see, for instance, Antle, 1987 , 1989 or Chavas and Holt 1996 . Although the two methods differ greatly in terms of underlying assumptions, they do have in common the fact that farmers are usually assumed to be expected utility (EU) maximisers, in accordance with the theory initially developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) .
One advantage of EU theory is the explicit distinction it makes between risk exposure and risk preferences, through using probabilities and a utility function (Chavas, Chambers and Pope, 2010) . Furthermore, it can be applied very easily, while appealing alternative theories are lacking (Just and Peterson, 2010) . However, its long-term dominance in agricultural economics is questionable for several reasons. First, since the work of Allais (1953) , psychologists and economists have provided substantial evidence that individuals do not necessarily behave according to the key assumptions underlying EU theory. Their behaviour seems indeed to deviate from EU in predictable and systematic ways. For instance, observed levels of risk aversion for small stakes are inconsistent with those observed for high stakes under EU theory (Rabin, 2000) . Second, over the last few years, empirical testing of EU against alternative theories for decision-making under risk has provided evidence in favour of the latter (e.g. Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden, 2002; Mason et al., 2005; Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 2010) . 1 In this paper, we seek to elicit farmers' risk preferences under EU theory and the competing prospect theory (PT). We use Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen's (2010) experimental design on a sample of French farmers. However, we estimate structural models of preferences instead of calculating preference parameters analytically.
2 This approach is more accurate for multiparameter models such as PT models because all parameters are jointly estimated. In addition, we investigate how parameters correlate with several farmer and farm characteristics.
Among the available non-EU theories, PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 ) is now viewed as the most convincing one (Camerer, 1998; Starmer, 2000) . Indeed, PT features two key factors in explaining EU anomalies, namely reference dependence and probability weighting. Whereas EU theory does not distinguish between gains and losses, in PT outcomes are classified as either gains or losses with respect to a reference point, and people are allowed to behave differently in each of the two outcome domains. Probability weighting refers to people's tendency to distort objective probabilities, which is accounted for in PT through a nonlinear valuation of outcomes with respect to objective probabilities. Assuming PT instead of EU potentially leads to a very different understanding of farmers' decisions (e.g. Tuthill and Frechette, 2004; Mattos, Garcia and Pennings, 2008) .
In addition, PT fits the agricultural context particularly well. On the one hand, it is likely that farmers do have reference points for outcome valuation, such as target prices on the futures markets (based on production costs) (Kim, Brorsen and Anderson, 2010) , subsistence incomes and solvency thresholds in the context of production choices (e.g. Mahul, 2000) , and pollution thresholds (Qiu, Prato and McCamley, 2001 ). Collins, Musser and Mason (1991) investigated the relationship between preference reversals and changes in income with data from grass seed growers. The results show that, after a loss of income, farmers change their behaviour from risk aversion to risk seeking. On the other hand, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that farmers rely on subjective probabilities rather than objective probabilities (e.g. Eales et al., 1990; Hardaker and Gudbrand, 2010) . At the same time, extreme events, in the sense that they are rather unlikely but entail dramatic consequences, are more and more common. Climate models indeed forecast higher growing-season temperatures with greater damage to agricultural production and larger impacts on farm income (Battisti and Naylor, 2009) , while price volatility on commodity markets tends to increase. It is most probable that farmers behave towards such extreme events in a specific way. In this context, the weighting of probabilities depending on the likelihood of events and the outcomes at stake may be more and more relevant to modelling farmers' decision-making process.
Our results contribute to a better characterisation of farmers' decisionmaking under risk in two ways. First, rather than relying on results from laboratory experiments with student samples, we provide experimental field evidence that PT preferences may better describe farmers' behaviour than EU preferences. Second, we provide agricultural economists with measures of farmers' preferences, in relation to farmer and farm characteristics. Specifically, we are not aware of any earlier attempt to elicit PT preferences in the context of a developed country.
3 Evidence in favour of non-EU preferences is expected to help understand farmers' decision-making and to design adequate policy instruments. In Section 2, we describe the most popular alternatives to EU theory and review the few studies that elicited farmers' risk preferences under non-EU theories and with experimental methods. In Section 3, we review some of the research fields in agricultural economics where PT preferences were shown to or are likely to matter. In Section 4, we describe our experimental protocol, while the estimation procedure for the EU and CPT risk preferences are laid out in Section 5. Results are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
Relevant literature

Non-EU theories of decision-making under risk
Numerous theories have been proposed as alternatives to EU (for a complete review, see Starmer, 2000) . In this section, we present the decision-weighting theories, which proved to be the most convincing. They all accommodate probability weighting, and some of them reference dependence as well. We focus on the way decision-weighting theories relate to each other, both historically and technically.
The study of decision-making under risk has been dominated by EU theory since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) . Although empirical data quickly demonstrated the existence of systematic violations (see Allais, 1953 , paradox for instance), the rigorous axiomatic basis, simplicity of use and normative appeal led researchers to prefer EU to alternative theories for decades. Originally defined for risk situations where the space of possible events and the corresponding probabilities were objectively known by the decision-maker, it was extended by Savage (1954) to subjective probabilities. However, subjective EU has been criticised for its lack of generality (see Ellsberg's, 1961, paradox) .
Decision-weighting theories emerged at the beginning of the 1980s, notably thanks to insights from the psychological experimental research. Today, they constitute the main alternative to EU. They hold in common preferences over prospects that are non-linear in probabilities. Before any decision is made, objective probabilities are converted into subjective probabilities, or decision weights. Among the class of decision-weighting theories, two well-known sub-classes are of particular interest: sign-dependent theories (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky's, 1979, PT) and rank-dependent theories (e.g. Quiggin's, 1982, rank-dependent EU theory) . Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) separable PT 4 features a probability weighting function which directly converts probabilities into decision weights, low probabilities being overweighted and high probabilities underweighted. However, this specification has the drawback of violating first-order stochastic dominance. In fact, the main contribution of separable PT to the understanding of decision-making lies in its framing of outcomes relative to a labile reference point, upper values representing gains and lower values losses. A two-part utility function captures the difference in behaviour in the two outcome domains. On the one hand, the curvature in the gain domain is reflected in the loss domain, meaning that concavity for gains implies convexity for losses (reflection effect and 'S-shape' utility function). On the other hand, the slope varies between the two outcome domains. It is usually steeper for losses than for gains, meaning that the disutility of a loss is stronger than the utility of a similar gain (loss aversion concept). The reflection effect and the slope difference also apply to the probability weighting function, which increases the contrast between gain and loss behaviour.
Some years later, to satisfy stochastic dominance, Quiggin (1982) developed in the rank-dependent EU theory the idea of decision weights involving cumulative probabilities instead of single probabilities. Cumulative probabilities are first transformed through the probability weighting function and then combined into decision weights. Finally, the decision weight attached to a given outcome depends on its likelihood (as in separable PT), and on its ranking relative to the other outcomes of the prospect with respect to the amount at stake. Thus, rank-dependent preferences are not separable in outcomes. The consequence for decision-making is that extreme outcomes (because of extreme stakes or very low probabilities) are particularly affected by decision weights. The usual empirical finding is the overweighting of high-and low-ranked outcomes, and the underweighting of middle-ranked outcomes.
5 This behaviour pattern is represented by an 'inverse S-shape' probability weighting function. 6 Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) combined in cumulative PT (CPT) the most remarkable features of separable PT and rank-dependent EU theory, namely gain-loss framing and cumulative decision weights.
Experimental elicitation of farmers' risk preferences under non-EU theories
As highlighted in Section 1, investigations about farmers' risk preferences based on non-EU theories are scarce. Here, we review the few recent exceptions, including those focusing on rural people in general. Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) , Liu (2013) and Nguyen and Leung (2009) are the closest to our own study because they use a similar experimental design to elicit CPT preferences. The method was originally developed by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) who applied it to a sample of rural Vietnamese households. The authors pointed out that CPT describes their data better than EU (with a reflected utility function at zero), with evidence in favour of utility concavity in the gain domain, loss aversion and an 'inverse S-shape' probability weighting function. Liu (2013) obtained similar results for Chinese cotton farmers. Nguyen and Leung (2009) used the same sample as Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) but focused on behaviour in relation to occupation. Farmers, who represented 46 per cent of their sample, were found to be significantly less loss-averse than non-farmers.
Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2010) tested separable PT and EU theory, but in the gain domain only. They used a large sample of people from rural Ethiopia, India and Uganda. They reported a significant underweighting of probabilities over a wide range of probabilities, giving the function either an S or a convex shape. However, when they allowed separable PT and EU to explain the data at the same time, they found significant mixing proportions close to 0.5, meaning that each model fits one half of the data better.
Similarly, Galarza (2009) focused on EU and CPT in the gain domain only. The author analysed the responses of small-scale cotton producers from Peru. Like Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2010) , Galarza showed that, overall, subjects distort probabilities, but that mixing proportions for EU and CPT are significant. About 30 per cent of the cotton producers exhibit EU while 70 per cent behave according to CPT.
In the context of developed countries, we are not aware of any attempt to estimate experimentally the parameters of some non-EU model from farmers' choices. However, Pennings and Smidts (2003) investigated nonparametrically sign-dependency behaviour on Dutch hog farmers. After measuring each respondent's utility, they found evidence for mixed preferences, in relation to farmers' strategy and organisation. Farmers who buy piglets exhibit mostly an 'S-shape' utility function (55 per cent) (i.e. concave for gains and convex for losses), whereas farmers who breed their own piglets mostly exhibit a fully concave or convex utility function (89 per cent).
Why PT matters in agricultural economics
Within the PT framework, utility curvature, loss aversion and probability weighting all affect the way individuals evaluate risky outcomes, which in turn modifies their behaviour. Thus, evaluating farmers' risk preferences assuming PT rather than EU may help better explain farmers' decision-making. Several studies provide arguments for why it may matter if we are to deliver more accurate modelling and predictions. In this section, we provide a review of these arguments in the context of developed countries, focusing first on the phenomena linked to reference dependence, namely the reflected utility curvature and loss aversion, and then on probability weighting.
Reference dependence
As mentioned earlier, reference dependence means that subjects care about changes in wealth, i.e. deviations from the reference point, rather than in the absolute initial or final wealth level as in von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947) EU theory. It implies a different behaviour depending on the sign of the wealth deviation, either positive or negative. It was shown empirically that this difference in behaviour proceeds from two phenomena: behaviour towards gains is reflected in the loss domain and losses loom larger than gains.
Reflection effect
If farmers are PT maximisers, they are expected to be mostly risk averse in the gain domain, but mostly risk seeking in the loss domain. Insurance demand is one prominent example where this type of reflected behaviour can explain deviations from what EU theory predicts. If individuals are risk-averse whatever the outcome domain as postulated by EU theory, it is in their best interest to purchase insurance because they are willing to pay a small guaranteed amount, the insurance premium, to avoid a potential but much larger loss. However, voluntary insurance is not always observed in the field, including in the agricultural sector. Farmers' participation in multiperil crop insurance has historically been low in a number of countries, until substantial premium subsidies or compulsory measures were implemented by public authorities, notably in the USA (Glauber, 2004; Enjolras and Sentis, 2011) . Several explanations for this striking phenomenon were provided. One is that insurers face asymmetries of information (adverse selection and moral hazard problems) and high administrative costs, which implies high insurance premiums compared with farmers' risk premiums. Another possible explanation is that insurance schemes compete at the farm level with other risk-hedging strategies. A last explanation involves the reflection effect: if farmers are risk-seeking for losses, it is rational for them to not insure and bear the risk of a potential high loss, rather than pay an insurance premium which is viewed as a small but certain loss.
Loss aversion
If farmers behave according to PT, they are more sensitive to losses than to equivalent gains. In a recent study, Liu and Huang (2013) highlighted the significant role of loss aversion in explaining pesticide use by Chinese cotton farmers by combining experimental measures with survey results. The authors suggested that more loss-averse farmers spray smaller amounts of pesticide than less loss-averse farmers because they are more sensitive to health deterioration.
Even if such a direct relationship cannot be tested in all cases, the agricultural literature provides several examples of deviations from a typical EU behaviour which may be explained by loss aversion. We distinguish between two empirical manifestations of loss aversion, the gain-loss framing effect and the endowment effect.
The gain-loss framing effect is the most obvious empirical observation revealing loss aversion: loss-averse individuals are not equally sensitive to a good, service or monetary unit if it is perceived as a gain or a loss. For instance, in crop production contracts, the base price can be considered as a reference point, and performance incentives like quality rewards as deviations from this point. Two frames are possible in such contracts: a high base price, along with penalties for poor performance, or a relatively low base price combined with rewards for good performance (Just and Wu, 2005) . Loss aversion implies that penalties and rewards are not perfect substitutes as is the case in EU, penalties looming larger than rewards. Thus, to keep farmers' participation rate unchanged, a contract involving penalties should provide farmers with a higher base price than a contract involving commensurate rewards. Hence, loss aversion has implications on the optimal contract design: reward systems are to be preferred over penalty systems because they minimise the contractor's costs.
Gain -loss disparity also influences the efficiency of public incentives, depending on whether they are designed as penalties or bonuses. Unlike the contract setting, a general recommendation is to prefer a penalty system to induce desired behaviour. For instance, Huijps et al. (2010) provided empirical evidence that dairy farmers are more sensitive to penalties than to bonuses when urged to adopt new milking practices to improve cattle health.
The endowment effect is another empirical manifestation of loss aversion.
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It refers to the fact that people demand more to give up an object, good or service (willingness-to-accept) than they are willing to pay to acquire it (willingness-to-pay) (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991) . In other words, the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility of acquiring it. The endowment effect has potentially important implications on farmers' willingness to comply with agri-environmental schemes. Such schemes grant farmers for reducing pesticide use (Christensen et al., 2011) , growing nitrogen fixing crops (Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé and Ruto, 2010) or providing ecosystem services (Wossink and Swinton, 2007) , for instance. Furthermore, the dynamics of innovation adoption and abandonment is an other important research field where the endowment effect may play a significant role. Huijps et al. (2010) provided empirical evidence in the case of milking practices aimed at improving cattle health. Farmers who had already implemented a given practice were asked if they would abandon this practice in response to different levels of decrease in costs and efficiency. The farmers who had not were asked if they would implement the practice in response to cost and efficiency increases of the same magnitude. The authors found that, when faced with symmetric stimuli, farmers who have already adopted an innovation are less willing to change their behaviour than nonadopters, and that transaction costs are not high enough to explain such a reluctance to change.
Probability weighting
Farmers who are PT maximisers distort objective probabilities into decision weights. Extreme-ranked and unlikely outcomes are overweighted compared with middle-ranked and likely outcomes. The success of single-peril insurance such as hail insurance can partly be explained by probability weighting. Contrary to multiperil schemes, single-peril schemes have usually been successfully managed by the private sector (Glauber, 2004; Enjolras and Sentis, 2011) . Even if single perils have potentially dramatic consequences on farmers' income, they are rare and moral hazard behaviour is limited due to their uncontrollability. Thus, insurers have been able to offer low insurance premiums relative to farmers' risk premiums, which is sufficient under EU to explain participation in the scheme. Nevertheless, probability weighting may be another explanation. Single perils like hail are typically high-impact low-probability losses for which farmers may be extremely sensitive. Thus, because of the overweighting of these perils, farmers may purchase insurance in greater numbers than predicted by EU.
In addition, probability weighting provides further insights with respect to probabilistic insurance. It is an insurance scheme where there is a small probability that the insured is not compensated for damage, in exchange for a reduction in the insurance premium. As outlined by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and later by Wakker, Thaler and Tversky (1997) , the overweighting of extreme outcomes has in this case a negative effect on the demand for probabilistic insurance. Wakker, Thaler and Tversky (1997: 7) showed indeed that people 'dislike probabilistic insurance and demand more than a 20 per cent reduction in the premium to compensate for a 1 per cent default risk'. In other words, people attach great importance to eliminating the smallest chance of failure. In fact, all insurances are probabilistic, including crop insurances. Most often, insurance contracts specify explicitly some cases in which the claim is not to be paid, and other risks on the insurer's side such as insolvency or fraud always implicitly exist (Wakker, Thaler and Tversky, 1997 ). Thus, not accounting for farmers' probability weighting is likely to mask the high cost of adding exclusion situations in insurance contracts or of abrading, even slightly, farmers' confidence in the insurance system. A second research area in which probability weighting has important implications is the design of contracts. Similarly to insurance policies, any real contract setting includes some low-probability explicit and implicit default risks leading to losses for the contractee. In the case of crop production contracts, a failure from the contractor has potentially dramatic consequences on farmers' income, especially if the crop is new because the relevant market may be still developing and alternative selling opportunities scarce (see for instance Alexander et al. (2012) in the context of perennial bioenergy crops). Thus, to ensure the participation of farmers who may distort probabilities, contractors should compensate for or minimise the counterparty risk, even if it may seem insignificant at first sight. The simplest incentive is to substantially increase the base price. However, a more cost-effective option would be to reduce the likelihood of the counterparty risk as perceived by farmers, or diminish its potential consequences. In the first case, contractors could provide more information about their commercial strategy and partners in order to increase farmers' trust. In the second case, they could sign up to a partnership with other crop traders or processors, each partner committing to buy each other's feedstock in the event of one partner's failure.
Price hedging is a third example where probability weighting may be helpful in explaining farmers' behaviour. In developed countries, the gradual elimination of public price regulation and market protection systems have contributed to increasing the price volatility of agricultural commodities. However, it was reported that few farmers resort to derivatives markets to hedge price risk (less than 10 per cent according to Garcia and Leuthold, 2004) . Mattos, Garcia and Pennings (2008) investigated this paradox by analysing the impact of cumulative probability weighting on soya bean producers' optimal position on the futures market. They found that probability weighting affects producers' position more than changes in utility curvature and loss aversion. More importantly, they showed that when probability weighting increases towards the overweighting of extreme events, the utility of resorting to futures decreases quickly. Hence, probability weighting is one possible explanation for farmers exhibiting little interest in financial instruments to hedge against price risk.
Experimental protocol
Experimental design and procedure
Our experimental design is adapted from Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen's (2010) risk task.
9 It consists of three series of choices, which are variants of Holt and Laury's (2002) multiple price lists. In practical terms, subjects are presented with a succession of pairs of binary lotteries, each pair being composed of a safe lottery (option A) and a risky lottery (option B). They are asked to pick one lottery in each row. In the first row, the expected value of lottery A is higher than the expected value of lottery B. As one proceeds down the rows, the expected value of lottery B increases more quickly than the expected value of lottery A, and in the last row the expected value of lottery B is higher than the expected value of lottery A. In the first two series, payoffs are all positive, whereas in the third and last series, lotteries mix positive and negative payoffs. To enforce monotonicity, subjects are asked to pick the row in which they 9 Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen's (2010) experiment is made up of a risk task aiming at measuring CPT parameters and a time task aiming at measuring time preference parameters. However, the two tasks are unrelated and can be implemented independently.
prefer lottery B to lottery A. Subjects who are very risk-averse may never switch -and always choose lottery A -and subjects who are very riskseeking may choose the risky lottery in the first row -and always choose lottery B. Risk neutral subjects would switch when lottery B overtakes lottery A in terms of expected value. The 33 lottery choices submitted to each subject are displayed in Table 1 . 10 We used substantial amounts of money from 10 to 6,000 euros in absolute value, the mean expected payoff being about 205 euros. This high payoff range has two advantages. On the one hand, farmers are presented with money values that they are used to handling in their production choices.
11
On the other hand, because individuals exhibit a quasi-linear utility at low stakes (Rabin, 2000; Holt and Laury, 2002) , we increase the chance of detecting utility curvature. The experiment was carried out from February to June 2010 as part of a larger survey. It took place after a 2-hour face-to-face interview aimed at collecting, inter alia, farmer and farm characteristics and understanding the drivers for the adoption of agricultural innovations. The experiment lasted around half an hour and was divided into three different tasks: a risk task, an ambiguity task and a time task. In this paper, we analyse only the results from the risk task. A comprehensive introduction of methods and goals, as well as examples, was given to respondents prior to the experiment to ensure a good comprehension of the task at hand. Subjects were provided with an initial endowment of 15 euros for their participation. After the subject had completed all three series, one row was randomly selected and the lottery initially chosen played for real money.
12
As we were not able to pay the full payoffs (ranging from 2600 to 6,000 euros in the risk task), at the beginning of the experiment respondents were advised that they would receive only a percentage of the payoffs. However, the exact amount was not announced. The predetermined percentage of 2 per cent was noted on a sheet of paper and enclosed in an opaque envelope prior to visiting respondents. The envelope was laid on the table in front of each respondent at the beginning of the experiment. 13 If selected, loss lotteries were played for real just like gain lotteries, but the initial endowment ensured that final earnings were not negative. The average earning from the three tasks was 19 euros. All instructions given to respondents are provided in Appendix 10 The difference in expected payoff between lotteries is not shown to respondents. The effect of providing expected value information is not well documented (Harrison and Rutströ m, 2008) . 11 For instance, the net margin of a traditional rape/wheat/barley rotation is around 430 euros/ha/ year in a French cereal-growing region (Bocqué ho and Jacquet, 2010). 12 Real money incentives are recommended to ensure respondents' commitment to the experiment and avoid hypothetical bias (Harrison and Rutströ m 2008: 123) . 13 The use of different currency units for lottery payoffs and for real payments is a procedure that has been followed by other experimentalists dealing with large payoffs, either in the laboratory (e.g. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L'Haridon, 2008) or in the field (e.g. Galarza, 2009) . As highlighted by an anonymous referee, it may add ambiguity to the task at hand. It may also introduce a complex set of heterogeneous behaviour if some farmers understood the exchange rate to be 2 per cent while others did not. In Section 6.3.1, we thus test for the sensitivity of our results to the exchange rate. 
Design adapted from Tanaka et al. (2010) . Lottery payoffs are in euros.
A in supplementary data at ERAE online, and record sheets are in Appendix B in supplementary data at ERAE online.
Sample
We elicited preferences from a population of farmers, 14 whereas most experimental studies rely on a laboratory setting which involves a university student population. This last practice can be criticised for at least three reasons. First, there are no grounds for systematically generalising all the results drawn from student responses to other people. Second, in the overwhelming majority of cases, there is no rational sampling, and thus the students who participate in the experiment are not representative of an economically significant population. Third, students are more homogeneous than the broader population with respect to important socio-demographic characteristics like age and education. Thus, drawing preferences from a student sample may fail to reveal all diversity in behaviour. As stressed by Harrison and List (2004) , field approaches are indeed complementary to laboratory approaches to give sharper and more relevant inferences about real behaviour.
We constructed our sample of farmers from 64 rural towns in Bourgogne, in the east of France. The region of Bourgogne has a diverse agricultural production, including cereal crops, livestock, market vegetables and wine. This diversity increases the possibility of detecting heterogeneity in individual behaviour. We randomly selected 232 subjects from the pool of farmers living in the chosen towns, 15 first contacted them by post, and followed up a few days later with a phone call to make an appointment. Among them, 85 subjects were excluded because of wrong profession or contact information. In the end, 111 farmers were surveyed and 107 participated in the experiment, corresponding to a response rate of 73 per cent (excluding farmers who refused to participate, lacked time or did not show up). 16 We believe that the induced selection bias is not critical. Indeed, when they were contacted, farmers were informed about a 2.5-hour survey but they were informed neither about the experiment nor the real payment mechanism. In addition, we measured key variables expected to modify risk preferences such as wealth (FarmSize variable), trust (Trust) and background risk (WheatRisk). As a result, there is little chance that a farmer's decision to participate, i.e. the probability of being included in the sample, was influenced by his or her own risk preferences or some unmeasured variable affecting risk preferences. Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics of farmer and farm characteristics thought to influence risk preferences. On average, the farmers were about 48 years old (Age) and had one child living in the household (NbChildren). One third had at least a secondary-school education level (EducSup). The mean farm size was 169 ha (FarmSize), with one-third of the land being owned by the farmer (Landowned). The mean extra-agricultural part of the households' income was 26 per cent (ExtraInc). Breeding farms (Livestock) represented 24 per cent of the sample. As mentioned earlier, other variables that may modify individual risk preferences are whether farmers trusted other people (Trust) and the background risk they faced (WheatRisk).
Unobserved location variables such as soil and climate can jointly affect risk preferences. We control for such location-specific characteristics with regional fixed effects, and thus focus on intra-regional variations of risk preferences. With the North dummy variable, we distinguish between the southern part of the sampling area which corresponds to the fertile plain of the Saône river and the northern part which corresponds to the limestone plateau of Bourgogne. On the plateau, soils are relatively poor and the climate is semi-continental, with long and harsh winters. Using North-South rather than town fixed effects minimises the risk of imprecise estimates and large standard errors inherent to fixed-effect models: the within-group variation of risk preferences is maximum (a lot of farmers in each region) while the loss of degrees of freedom is minimum (only two regions). Furthermore, in our sample, all farmers have land in several towns, including in several of the 64 selected towns. As a result, the town information is not relevant to capture location-specific soil and climate factors.
Estimation methods
A flexible way of eliciting preference parameters from experimental data is the estimation of structural models, as initially proposed by Harless and Camerer (1994) . In particular, this approach is suitable for specifications that involve several preference parameters like CPT. In this paper, we present the different EU and CPT structural models that will be estimated in Section 6. Although not based on any theory, it is widely assumed that under PT one's reference point corresponds to the status quo, or, equivalently, one's current assets (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . In our experiment, because the initial endowment is given before farmers make any choice, it is supposed to be integrated into current assets. Thus, all farmers care about the difference between final assets and current assets (including the initial endowment), i.e. the lottery payoffs. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore current assets in the estimation procedure: the reference point is zero and final assets are the lottery payoffs.
EU (with a reflected utility function at zero)
Let us first assume that the utility of income follows a two-piece power specification (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker, 2008) :
where y is the lottery payoff and r is an anti-index of risk aversion for gains (r . 0). Indeed, in the gain domain (y ≥ 0), this utility specification implies risk seeking (utility convexity) for r . 1, risk neutrality (linearity) for r ¼ 1 and risk aversion (concavity) for r , 1. Because u( . ) is symmetrical with respect to 0, the interpretation of r for gains is reflected for losses, i.e. r . 1 stands for risk aversion (utility concavity).
17
17 Strictly speaking, utility functions complying with von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947) EU theory are defined only over positive amounts that correspond to absolute wealth levels: they are either fully concave (for a risk averse behaviour) or fully convex (for a risk seeking behaviour). However, in the recent experimental literature, EU can have a broader meaning and involve
In the experiment, subjects are asked to choose between lottery A (y A,1 , p A ; y A,2 ) and lottery B (y B,1 , p B ; y B,2 ) over a series of j questions. At each question, the EU of subject i for each lottery (A or B) is written as follows:
where y A,1 , y A,2 and y B,1 , y B,2 are the payoffs of each lottery A or B, respectively; and p A and p B are the probabilities associated with the left payoffs of each lottery A or B. Assuming that subjects follow a utility-maximising behaviour, observed choices are driven by a latent choice index D which is the difference between the utilities for lotteries A and B (Harrison and Rutström, 2008) , that is under EU:
We then build upon Manski and Lerman's (1977) random utility model to develop an empirical model of choice. Utility is broken down into a deterministic part (Equation (3)) which contains the preference parameter(s) to be estimated (r i ), plus a random part capturing unobserved heterogeneity (1 i ). Preference parameters are supposed to depend on observable individual characteristics (vector X i ) through a linear relationship which is constant over subjects:
where u 0 and vector u are coefficients to be estimated. The binary choice between lottery A or B can thus be described by the following latent regression model:
where 1 is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and known variance v. We can derive from the above equation the probability that subject i will choose lottery A:
utility functions that are defined over positive and negative lottery payoffs, and are domainspecific (e.g. Harrison and Rutströ m, 2008; Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 2010; Nguyen, 2011). where F( . ) denotes the standard normal distribution function. The right-hand side thus lies in the interval [0;1] for any value of D EU i . We estimate the risk preference parameters r i with maximum likelihood methods. The likelihood of the observed choices, conditional on the EU and power utility specifications being true, is as follows:
where k indexes the different lottery choices pooled over subjects (k¼(i, j)), I is the indicator function; and
denotes the choice of lottery A [B] . The maximum-likelihood estimation for the risk parameter is therefore:
Since the power specification might appear very restrictive, one may consider other functional forms for utility, for instance to allow for varying degrees of relative risk aversion. Here, we consider a variant of Saha's (1993) expopower (EP) specification (Holt and Laury, 2002; Abdellaoui, Barrios and Wakker, 2007) :
where a and b are indexes of risk aversion for gains (a . b.0). The EP specification accommodates the usual empirical finding of a decreasing absolute risk aversion and an increasing relative risk aversion. When a ¼ 1, absolute risk aversion is constant, and when b tends to 0, relative risk aversion is constant as in the power specification. Replacing the power utility by an EP utility in Equations (2a) and (2b) The maximum-likelihood joint estimation for risk parameters a and b is therefore:
Cumulative PT
An alternative paradigm for subjects' behaviour could be CPT, with a power utility function exhibiting a different slope in the gain and the loss domain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) : In this specification, s is an anti-index of utility concavity for gains (s . 0) 18, 19 and l is the decision-maker's coefficient of loss aversion (l . 0). The decisionmaker is more (resp. less) sensitive to losses than to gains when l . 1 (resp. l , 1). The usual empirical finding is l . 1, along with s , 1 (concave utility in the gain domain). Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , decision weights defined over cumulative probabilities are introduced. The value of any binary lottery (y 1 , p; y 2 ) is as follows:
where v( . ) is a probability weighting function which is is strictly increasing from the unit interval into itself, and satisfies v(0) ¼ 0 and v(1) ¼ 1. The form of the weighting function has widely been discussed. Following Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) , we prefer Prelec's (1998) specification:
where g is the parameter controlling the curvature of the probability weighting function (g . 0). 20 This parameter can be interpreted as an index of likelihood sensitivity, with g ¼ 1 reflecting the absence of probability distortion (v(p) ¼ p).
21 In other words, as g decreases (g , 1), the distinction between different levels of probability gets more and more blurred, and probabilities tend to be perceived as all being equal. This is the normal assumption, backed by a substantial amount of empirical evidence, and giving to the weighting function 18 In PT, risk behaviour depends on other factors besides utility, namely loss aversion and probability weighting. Thus, s is no longer an index of risk behaviour but just a measure of utility curvature. 19 In the original specification of CPT by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , two distinct parameters control utility curvature, one for the gain domain and one for the loss domain. However, in most empirical applications they are merged (see Wakker (2010: 267 -271) for an explanation of the analytical reasons justifying such a simplification). 20 CPT can also accommodate different curvatures for the probability weighting function depending on the outcome domain. However, in most empirical applications, it is assumed that a single parameter operates in both domains, like for the utility function. 21 Originally, Prelec (1998) proposed a two-parameter function, one parameter standing for likelihood sensitivity, and one parameter for pessimism. Indeed, the prevailing empirical finding is that deviation from linear probability weighting results from a combination of both phenomena. Whereas likelihood sensitivity is viewed as a consequence of cognitive limitations in the perception of objective probabilities, pessimism is considered as a motivational distortion of probabilities which depends on outcome ranks. If the decision-maker is pessimistic, bad outcomes are overweighted while good outcomes are underweighted. Optimism is defined by the opposite behaviour. Likelihood sensitivity affects the curvature of the probability weighting function, while pessimism affects its elevation. However, the effect of pessimism on probability weighting was found to be low compared with likelihood sensitivity, and, as such, is often ignored in empirical applications (see Wakker, 2010 , for more details).
an 'inverse S-shape'. In the case of a binary prospect such as a lottery, it characterises an overweighting of the low-probability outcome and an underweighting of the high-probability outcome. If g . 1, the function takes the less conventional 'S-shape'. At the extreme, if g is very high, probabilities tend to be perceived as either 0 or 1. In CPT, risk behaviour results from the interplay of utility curvature, loss aversion and probability weighting.
Note that the CPT model reduces to the EU-power model (Equation (1)) if l ¼ 1 and g ¼ 1.
The derivation of the likelihood function for CPT follows the same steps than for EU. By denoting D CPT the difference in prospect utilities, the likelihood of the observed choices, conditional on our CPT specification being true, is written as follows:
The maximum-likelihood estimation for (s, l, g) is then:
It should be mentioned that the original experiment by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) is such that any combination of choices in the three series determines a particular interval for the CPT parameter values. As a result, an identification of parameters through maximum likelihood is possible in theory. The implementation was done in STATA following the procedure for survey data (svy: prefix). In particular, the standard errors are clustered to correct for the possibility that responses from the same subject are correlated. The STATA program uses maximum likelihood routines for structural choice models adapted from Harrison and Rutström (2008) .
Results
Raw results
The distribution of switching points from the 107 farmers is shown in Table 3 . For each subject, we also calculate the corresponding CPT parameters using the analytical 'midpoint technique'.
22 Then, we derive estimates of mean values and corresponding standard errors for the underlying population. We find that, on average, the parameter s controlling utility curvature is 0.51 (with a 95 per cent confidence interval of [0.41,0.62]) and the loss aversion parameter l is 3.76 (with a 95 per cent confidence interval of [2.93,4.58]). Regarding the likelihood sensitivity parameter, we find that the mean value of g is 0.65 with a 95 per cent confidence interval of [0.56,0.73] ). These estimates are in line with those calculated with similar methods by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2013) for rural people from developing countries. 
Estimation of structural models of risk preferences
In this section, we estimate various decision models, namely the two EU models and the CPT model defined in Section 5. For each model, we consider (i) uniform risk preferences among farmers (model 1), (ii) varying preferences driven by farmer characteristics (model 2), (iii) varying preferences driven by farm characteristics (model 3) and (iv) varying preferences driven jointly by farmer and farm characteristics (model 4). 23 Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2013) reported mean values of about 0.60 (between 0.59 and 0.63) and 0.52, respectively, for utility convexity (s in this paper) and of about 2.63 and 3.47 for loss aversion (l). They found values of 0.74 and 0.69 for likelihood sensitivity (g). 24 We intended to detect potential multicollinearity between farmer and farm characteristics by computing the variance inflation factor for each variable. All coefficients were found to be lower than 2, meaning that there is no major multicollinearity problem (the threshold is around 10).
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6.2.1. EU (with a reflected utility function at zero) Table 4 reports the EU estimates, assuming a power specification for utility. In model 1, the parameter r controlling utility curvature is estimated to be 0.21, with a 95 per cent confidence interval between 0.17 and 0.25. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the r values predicted by model 4. It indicates that farmers exhibit a quite uniform behaviour towards the high payoffs considered in the experiment. The risk aversion index 1 2 r is predicted to be over 0.5 for the whole sample, meaning that farmers are very risk-averse in the gain domain and very risk-seeking in the loss domain. It contrasts with the moderate values obtained with other experimental data from developed countries. However, as shown in Table 4 , we could not find any significant effect of individual characteristics on the r parameter. Table 5 gives the risk parameter estimates for the flexible EP utility form. With model 1,â is 0.29 andb is 0.12, the 95 per cent confidence intervals being [0.25, 0.33] and [0.08, 0.16], respectively. Sinceâ is significantly less than 1 andb is significantly more than 0, risk preferences appear to be characterised by a decreasing absolute risk aversion and an increasing relative risk aversion (in the gain domain). These results are in line with those usually obtained in laboratory settings with student populations (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002) . 25 In contrast with the power specification, we observe from model 4 that many farmer and farm characteristics have a significant influence on the EP risk parameters. Usually, each characteristic affects only one of the two a and b parameters. Variables NbChildren, EducSup, FarmSize, ExtraInc, Livestock and IdleLand are significant determinants of a but not of b, whereas Trust, LandOwned, IndivOwner and North are significant determinants of b only. This result supports the use of the EU-EP specification to better describe farmers' risk behaviour. As expected, the more educated and trusting the farmers, the larger the farm (a proxy for wealth) and the higher the proportion of extra-agricultural income (a proxy for income stability), the lower the risk aversion (for gains). On the contrary, livestock breeders, farmers with more idle land, individual owners and farmers facing poorer growing conditions tend to be more risk averse than the others (in the gain domain). The global effect of Age on risk aversion is unclear as it affects a and b in opposite directions. Table 6 gives the parameter estimates for the more elaborate CPT specification. The three risk parameters s, l and g estimated with model 1 are all significantly different from 1 at the 1 per cent level, implying a non-linear utility function, loss aversion and probability weighting. The estimated mean value for s is 0.28 (with a 95 per cent confidence interval of [0.25,0.31]), consistent with a concave utility in the gain domain and a convex utility in the loss domain. However, it is slightly higher than when estimated with the EU-power model, meaning that some of the utility curvature is captured by loss aversion or probability weighting. Indeed, the loss aversion parameter l is estimated to be significantly different from 1 and equal to 2.28 on average, with a 95 per cent confidence interval between 1.80 and 2.75. It means that farmers are about twice as sensitive to losses as to equivalent gains. Similarly, the likelihood sensitivity parameter g is estimated to be significantly different from 1. Its mean value is 0.66, with a 95 per cent confidence interval between 0.50 and 0.81. This provides some evidence of probability distortion in the expected direction: the weighting function is 'inverse S-shaped' and low-probability extreme events are overweighted. Our estimates of the loss aversion and likelihood sensitivity parameters are very similar to the values reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for a student sample (2.25 for loss aversion, 0.61 for likelihood sensitivity in the gain domain and 0.69 for likelihood sensitivity in the loss domain). Figure 2 represents the distributions ofŝ,l andĝ as predicted by model 4. The distribution ofŝ is similar to that obtained with the EU-power specification, that is to say homogeneity over farmers and a mean value denoting a strongly concave utility function in the gain domain (ŝ , 0.5). However, the distribution is shifted towards the right, showing once again that some of the utility curvature has been transferred to the other risk parameters l and g. The predicted l and g vary much more than the predicted s. Indeed, a sizeable proportion of farmers is expected to be extremely loss-averse (l . 5) or, on the contrary, loss-seeking (l , 1). Also, many farmers tend to be extremely sensitive to low-probability extreme events (ĝ close to 0), while a few farmers tend to underweight them (ĝ . 1). The last two columns of Table 6 give additional information on the relationship between risk behaviour under CPT and individual characteristics. First, we observe that trusting farmers exhibit a utility function which is significantly more concave (in the gain domain) than that of non-trusting farmers, meaning that trust tends to increase risk aversion (in the gain domain). At first sight, this seems to contradict previous results under the EU-EP specification. However, at the same time, Trust strongly shifts the g parameter towards 1: trusting farmers are more able to discriminate between probabilities, and thus are less prone to probability distortion, than non-trusting farmers. One explanation may be that trusting farmers rely more on the objective information they are given. This link may result in a negative relationship between farmers' overall risk aversion (for gains) and trust. As regards loss aversion, low values are explained by the effect of Age, EducSup and ExtraInc while high values are explained by the effect of IdleLand. As expected, the older and the more educated the farmer, and the more stable the household income, the lower the loss aversion. Nguyen and Leung (2009) reported a similar effect of education on loss aversion in a Vietnamese context.
Cumulative PT
There do not appear to be major differences in risk behaviour in relation to liquidity constraints, which are represented by farmers' use of deferred payments (DeffPayment). This result holds whatever the decision model. It conflicts with some empirical and theoretical studies that demonstrate the positive impact of liquidity constraints on risk aversion due to a shortening of decisionmakers' time horizon and a reduction of their ability to smooth consumption over time (Gollier, 2001; Guiso and Paiella, 2008) .
Moreover, we cannot find any significant effect of farm risk on risk preferences, background risk being proxied by the risk farmers face on wheat production (Wheat Risk). This result contrasts with the theoretical predictions of Gollier and Pratt (1996) and Quiggin (2003) about the influence of background risk on decision-making. However, even when inducing an explicit background risk in a laboratory setting, Lusk and Coble (2008) found that the effect of background risk on risk preferences was not particularly large. The authors presented three possible explanations: the existence of some uncontrolled background risk, the prevalence of non-EU behaviour among subjects and the tendency to assess independent risks in isolation rather than jointly. These three explanations may apply in our case. First, uncontrolled background risk can arise from other farm activities than wheat production, or even extra-agricultural activities. In addition, although we were cautious about accounting for wheat risks that were unlikely to be covered in the short term, some of them may still be lower in reality due to uncontrolled coverage mechanisms. In other words, farmers may have considered residual wheat risks instead of full wheat risks when making the lottery choices. Second, as shown by Quiggin (2003) , independent risks are complementary under rank-dependent preferences, that is, aversion to foreground risk is reduced by the presence of an independent background risk. Gollier and Pratt (1996) proved the opposite for EU preferences. Thus, if preference functionals are actually mixed among subjects and situations (Harrison and To estimate the preference parameters, we have assumed that each farmer had assessed the lotteries with respect to the payoffs presented in the game. However, farmers were only paid a fraction of the lottery gains, based on an exchange rate (2 per cent) which was disclosed at the end of the experiment. Since farmers were told that their initial endowment (15 euros) ensured positive final earnings, they may have inferred that the upper bound of the exchange rate was around 2 per cent. 27 To check whether our assumption was problematic, we have re-estimated model 1 for the three decision frameworks, assuming that farmers were using a 1 and a 2 per cent exchange rate.
The estimates for the risk parameters are found to be very similar to those obtained with the original lottery payoffs (Table 7) . This is not surprising since multiplying all outcomes by the same positive constant does not modify the distribution of the latent index
because the three specifications rely on a power (or EP) form (Wakker, 2008) . As an additional robustness check, we have also re-estimated the models when the initial endowment is integrated into the utility function. Estimates of r, a, b, s, l and g are not significantly affected.
Estimation strategy
One underlying assumption of the maximum likelihood estimation is the independence of observations. This assumption may not hold in our experiment since the choices made by a single farmer in each of the three series are not independent of one another. A within-subject clustering would not fully correct for it because each series is an ordered list. We thus adopt another strategy which consists in restricting the observed responses in each ordered list to the preferred lottery and the lottery being immediately dominated. For instance, if a subject switches at line 6 in task 1, then we simply keep the two observations indicating that in line 5 lottery A is preferred to lottery B, and in line 6 lottery B is preferred to lottery A. As a result, the maximum number of observations per individual is restricted to 6 (two observations per series).
In Table 8 , Column 2, we report the CPT parameters estimated by maximum likelihood on this restricted set of observations. It can be seen 27 In our experiment the maximal loss is 800 euros, in the ambiguity task not presented in this paper. Since the initial endowment is 15 euros, the upper bound of the exchange rate is around 2 per cent (15/800 ¼ 1.9 per cent).
that the parameters estimated on the full set of observations (Column 1) are in fact quite similar. It indicates that the dependence of observations from a given subject is not likely to be problematic in our case. As a last check, we also report in Table 8 , Column 3, the parameter values obtained with the midpoint technique used by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) . These values were already presented in Section 6.1. Once again, estimated values are similar except for loss aversion which appears to be greater with the midpoint technique.
Reference point
An implicit assumption of the two-piece utility specification in the CPT model (and in the EU model with reflected utility) is that a farmers' reference point is unique and equals zero. However, it was shown that reference points might be strictly positive or negative, especially when they depend upon individual expectations (Kó´szegi and Rabin, 2006) . In our experiment, as mentioned earlier, the initial endowment is probably the farmers' reference point as it corresponds to a status quo situation. As a robustness check, we have estimated several CPT models with a reference point varying from 2150 to 100 euros with 10-euro increments. We report the sensitivity of the log-pseudolikelihood and the three risk parameters to the reference point in Figure 3 . The log-pseudolikelihood reaches a maximum (27027.34) for a reference point of 260 euros, but the curve is very flat around this point. In fact, the log-pseudolikelihood curve exhibits a plateau for reference points ranging from 280 to 10 euros, thus including zero. In addition, over this range, parameter values are quite similar, except for l values which increase quickly as soon as the reference point is 250 euros or less. As a consequence, our estimations are robust to errors in the assumed reference point.
Conclusion
Alternatives to EU theory such as PT have the potential to give new insights into farmers' behaviour in a risky environment. We first review some empirical evidence and implications of farmers being PT maximisers in different fields such as crop insurance, contract design, market finance and innovation adoption. We then estimate structural preference models in the EU and CPT Fig. 3 . Sensitivity of the log-pseudolikelihood and CPT preferences to the assumed reference point.
frameworks, based on a sample of French farmers, and using real monetary incentives. We also investigate how preferences correlate with several farmer and farm characteristics.
On average, farmers are found to exhibit a concave utility function for gain outcomes, which under EU means risk aversion. However, CPT explains farmers' behaviour more fully than EU in the context of our experiment. Indeed, farmers value losses twice as much as gains of the same magnitude, meaning loss aversion. In addition, they exhibit an inverse S-shape probability weighting function, meaning that they tend to overweight low-probability extreme events. These results support a larger use of behavioural models such as PT in agricultural economics. More specifically, in order to design more effective and efficient policies or schemes, public and private actors should account for the asymmetry between gain and loss outcomes from farmers' point of view and take into greater consideration low-probability extreme events.
The focus of our study was to highlight the existence of some non-EU behaviours among farmers and to overall assess the suitability of PT. Given these objectives, it was sufficient to assume that the data were generated by only one decision model, either EU or PT. Further research could fine-tune our analysis by estimating a mixture model (Harrison and Rutström, 2009; Bruhin, FehrDuda and Epper, 2010) . Such models assume explicitly that observed behaviour can proceed from different theoretical frameworks, and thus can help in providing a choice-by-choice assessment of competing frameworks. On a related note, other field experiments performed with different payoff ranges and choice frames would be valuable to examine the extent to which our results apply to other decision contexts.
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